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NOTE
IN THE MATTER OF JUVENILES A, B, C, D, E:
ANALYZING THE RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS BY JUNKYARD
STANDARDS
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times
of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
endure. The World War II relocation cases, and the Red scare
and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases are only the most
extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms
to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we
invariably come to regret it.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 is an extraordinarily
frightening and often misunderstood disease.' The inability of the medi-
cal community to fully comprehend this elusive and ultimately fatal dis-
ease has engendered a public hysteria that is now being reflected in
public health laws and penal laws throughout the country. In the desper-
ate struggle to find an effective means of combating the spread of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)-which causes AIDS-society has begun
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
2. "AIDS" is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 24 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Legislative programs reflect the public's concerns regarding AIDS and how to con-
trol its spread. A number of public polls conducted over a six-month period between Sep-
tember, 1985, and January, 1986, found that between 28% and 51% of the respondents
favored quarantining people with AIDS from the general public. See Larry Gostin, The
Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1017, 1019 n.6 (1989). Many of the programs advocated by legislatures as a result of
this type of public pressure have been labeled "unwarranted" and "absurd" by the scien-
tific community. Bernadette Pratt Sadler, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights:
Mandatory HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REV. 195,
195 (1992) (citing Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED: 34, 45
n.44 (1990)).
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to look beyond the boundaries of the medical community. Public policy
and legislation have become the weapons of choice in the battle against
AIDS. Without a medical cure on the immediate horizon, legislators
around the United States have attempted to create legislative "cures" by
enacting various mandatory testing schemes that are mainly panaceas for
unwarranted fears. These measures rarely address in a rational manner
the problems associated with the AIDS virus because these legislative
mandates are enacted as the result of immense public pressure. Thus,
they reflect an inaccurate and hysterical understanding of the AIDS virus.
As a result, AIDS not only threatens the physical well-being of the citi-
zens of this country, but, as this Note explains, also threatens important
American constitutional principles.
One of the most volatile issues confronting legislators today is how to
balance the fears and concerns of sexual assault victims against the consti-
tutional rights of convicted sex offenders in a manner that preserves the
integrity of the Fourth Amendment and the constitutional right to pri-
vacy. Admittedly, the balance is a delicate one. The State of Washington
has joined an ever-increasing number of states attempting to define the
boundary between public sympathy and constitutionality by enacting
mandatory HIV testing laws which attempt to balance the privacy issues
associated with testing for sexually transmitted diseases and the need to
reduce the incidence of HIV transmission efficiently and effectively.4 The
Washington state legislature attempted to grapple with the issue of pro-
tecting the public health by granting a victim of sexual assault access to
the mandatory HIV test results of the assailant. In so doing, the Wash-
ington state legislature has imprudently narrowed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy by permitting HIV testing of
convicted sex offenders for the purpose of providing victims with infor-
mation about their own health. As this Note will show, a victim of sexual
assault cannot obtain accurate information about his/her own health from
HIV test results of her offender.
In In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E,5 the appellants-defendants argued that
the drawing of their blood for HIV testing violated constitutional prohibi-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures under both the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of
Washington.6 The Washington Supreme Court, however, upheld the ap-
4. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.015 (West 1992).
5. 847 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1993).
6. Id. at 459.
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plication of the mandatory testing scheme set out in section
70.24.340(1)(a) 7 of the Washington Code to all five juveniles who were
found to have committed various sexual offenses under section 9A.448 of
Washington's criminal code. The court held that it was not necessary for
the government to obtain a warrant before testing the appellants' blood
because the searches were outside the criminal context and thus governed
by the more liberal "special needs" doctrine.9 The court justified the ap-
plication of the special needs test for the following reasons: the HIV test-
ing statute was part of the, health and public safety code of Washington;
the purpose of testing the appellants was not to obtain evidence against
them for use in a criminal case; a positive test would not place them at
risk for a new conviction or longer sentence; and the traditional require-
ment of individualized suspicion, which ordinarily gives rise to probable
cause to search, was impractical because HIV infection generally has no
immediate outward manifestations.' ° Additionally, the court found that
the State's compelling interest in combating the spread of AIDS, protect-
ing the rights of victims, facilitating effective prison management, and
aiding an HIV-positive sexual offender through counseling outweighed
the appellants' privacy in their bodily fluids."
Affirming the State's interest in testing without regard to the victim's
minimal risk of exposure to HIV, the court rejected the appellants' argu-
ment that the statute improperly included behavior that is incapable of
transmitting the virus.' 2 Finally, the court rejected the appellants' argu-
ment that mandatory HIV testing violates the appellants' constitutional
right to privacy. The court found that the testing statute imposes minimal
intrusion on the confidentiality branch of privacy because the statute spe-
cifically limited the scope of dissemination of the test results.13 The court
7. The Washington statute provides, "[liocal health departments authorized under
this chapter shall conduct or cause to be conducted pre-test counseling, HIV testing, and
post-test counseling of all persons: Convicted of a sexual offense under chapter 9A.44
RCW." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340(1)(a) (West 1992).
8. Under Washington's criminal code the following are listed as sexual offenses and
thus any person convicted of committing one of these' offenses would have to submit to an
HIV test: 1) rape in the first, second, or third degree, id. §§ 44.040-.060 (West 1992 & Supp.
1994); 2) rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree, id. §§ 9A.44.073, .076, .079; 3)
child molestation in the first, second, or third degree, id. §§ 9A.44.083, .086, .089; 4) sexual
misconduct with a minor in the first and second degree, id. §§ 9A.44.093, .096; and 5) inde-
cent liberties, id. § 9A.44.100.
9. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 459.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 460-61.
12. Id. at 461.
13. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.115 (West 1992).
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also concluded that the testing scheme did not conflict with the appel-
lants' privacy interest in autonomy because the statute serves the state's
compelling interests and is narrowly tailored to meet these interests.'4
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in this case is highly prob-
lematic because the court neglected to carefully consider whether the
mandatory testing scheme furthers the State's asserted purpose for enact-
ing the statute: providing testing programs that deal "efficiently and ef-
fectively with reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases."' 5
In so doing, the Washington Supreme Court did little more than pay lip
service to the Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy. By applying
the rational relationship test to its analysis and eliminating even a mini-
mal probable cause requirement, the court made mandatory HIV testing
easier to justify under circumstances in which the propriety of testing is
highly questionable. For example, a cursory examination of the facts Of
each assault in In re Juveniles reveals that the conduct of only two of the
juvenile offenders presented any risk of transmitting HIV.' 6 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court's decision, therefore, sets unsound and dangerous
precedent in that it upholds a constitutionally infirm testing scheme
which sacrifices fundamental principals of the Fourth Amendment and
the right to privacy by' allowing testing of a sex offender absent a prob-
able cause inquiry. Additionally, the court's decision perpetuates the
dangerous myth that current AIDS testing technology is capable of pro-
ducing sufficiently accurate results upon which a victim may rely to indi-
cate. her/his own HIV status.
This Note evaluates the constitutionality of Washington's mandatory
HIV testing statute as it applies to convicted sex offenders17 and con-
14. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 462-63.
15. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.015 (West 1992).
16. Modes of transmission are very specific. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying
text. Juveniles "A" and "D" both were charged with "indecent liberties with a minor."
Specifically, Juvenile "A" was adjudicated as having sodomized a four-year-old boy and
Juvenile "D" was adjudicated as having rubbed his genitals and his hands against the geni-
tals of an 11-year-old girl. Both of these acts pose a possible risk of transmission. How-
ever, Juveniles "B," "C," and "E" were all adjudicated as having committed first degree
molestation. Their acts, while serious, consisted of fondling the young children and, in one
instance, Juvenile "E" placed his mouth on the penis of a seven-year-old boy. It is impor-
tant to note that there is no scientific evidence proving that HIV can be transmitted
through any of these methods. Id.
17. The Washington statute provides:
[ L]ocal health departments authorized under this chapter shall conduct or cause
to be conducted pretest counseling, HIV testing, and post-test counseling of all
persons: (a) convicted of a sexual offense under chapter 9A.44 RCW; :. . (2) Such
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cludes that it is unconstitutional as an arbitrary and irrational scheme.
This Note further concludes that mandatory HIV testing of convicted sex
offenders, in general, is an inadequate method of preventing the spread of
HIV infection among a state's citizens. First, this Note presents back-
ground information on the prevalence of AIDS, the etiology of AIDS,
modes of transmission, and methods of testing for HIV. Next, this Note
discusses the various Fourth Amendment analyses used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in determining whether the government's actions are rea-
sonable, including the probable cause requirement and the evolution of
the "special needs" doctrine. This Note then discusses the branch of the
constitutional right to privacy implicating confidentiality, focusing on the
propriety of applying the doctrine of compelling need or probable cause
over that of rational basis review to mandatory HIV testing for convicted
felons. Finally, this Note analyzes how the Washington Supreme Court
applied these constitutional standards to the facts at issue in In re
Juveniles and concludes that the statute is unconstitutional on its face be-
cause it is not rationally related to its legislative purpose. Additionally,
the Note concludes that the court's rejection of the probable cause re-
quirement in favor of the "special needs" doctrine is erroneous because
the statute does not serve a compelling state interest sufficient to justify
the governmental intrusion into an individual's fundamental right to
privacy.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
A. Statistical Prevalence of HIV Infection Among the United States
Population
AIDS was discovered in the United States in 1981,18 and in a relatively
short period of time, has emerged as a leading cause of death in the
United States.' 9 The disease spread at an alarming rate since its first in-
troduction into the U.S. population. Human Immunodeficiency Virus in-
testing shall be conducted as soon as possible after sentencing and shall be so
ordered by the sentencing judge.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.24.340(1)(a), (2) (West 1992). The crimes which one must
be convicted of to fall under this statute include first degree rape, second degree rape, third
degree rape, first degree statutory rape, second degree statutory rape, third degree statu-
tory rape, and indecent liberties. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44 (West 1988)
(defining crimes listed above).
18. Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1128 (1987).
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: Mortality Attributable to
HIV Infection/AIDS Among Persons Aged 25-44 Years, 270 JAMA 305 (1993).
1994]
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fection caused the deaths of 29,850 U.S. residents in 1991 alone.20 In
1990, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported 41,616 cases of
AIDS in the United States.2 1 The State of Washington reported 556 cases
of AIDS in 1991.22 Approximately 0.4% of AIDS cases in 1990 were
found among the teenage population. 23 The CDC reported 439 cases of
AIDS in adolescents between the ages of thirteen and nineteen in 1989,
however, the CDC estimated that for every child who had AIDS in 1989,
there were at least another two to ten children who were infected with
HIV.24
1. Etiology of AIDS and the AIDS Virus
While AIDS is an extremely complex disease, the progression of the
disease is generally predictable. AIDS develops when the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus is introduced into the individual's bloodstream. 5
Human Immunodeficiency Virus antibodies usually develop within one to
six months after initial infection. However, the time between the initial
infection of the individual and the point at which the antibodies can be
detected, commonly called the "window period," can last longer in some
individuals.26 The virus breaks down a person's immune system by de-
stroying the T-helper cells which are a fundamental part of the-body's
infection-fighting mechanism. ' As HIV destroys more and more of the
T-helper cells, the body becomes increasingly vulnerable to infections
that an otherwise healthy immune system could easily eradicate.2 8  Ini-
tially, an HIV-infected individual is asymptomatic, but as the virus breaks
down the immune system, the person gradually enters into the second
stage of AIDS, AIDS Related Complex (ARC). 9 It is important to note,
however, that symptoms of AIDS may not emerge for three to five years
20. Id.
21. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1992, No. 192, 125 (1992).
22. Id.
23. THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AIDS
BENCHBOOK 10 (Abby R. Rubenfeld ed. 1991) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK].
24. Id. at 10-11. See also id. at 156 n.2 (no separate figures are available for children
and adolescents who have not developed AIDS but are HIV positive).
25. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
26. Harold W. Jaffe, What Doctors Want to Tell Judges About AIDS, 29 JUDGES' J. 8,
10 (Spring 1990).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. AIDS-Related Complex is characterized by non-life-threatening conditions such as
fever, weight loss, or enlargement of the lymph nodes. Id. at 11.
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after HIV antibodies develop in an individual, and, in some cases, the
virus may remain dormant for fifteen years.3" During this period of dor-
mancy the individual is capable of transmitting the virus to others
through certain conduct.3 ' Severe immune deficiency marks the final
stage of AIDS. At this point, the individual's immune system is so weak
that s/he becomes extremely susceptible to life-threatening opportunistic
infections, cancers, and neurological diseases.3 2
2. Transmission of HIV
Although originally diagnosed in homosexual men, AIDS has spread
throughout the heterosexual adult, heterosexual juvenile, and prenatal
populations. Human Immunodeficiency Virus has been detected in
blood, semen, vaginal secretions, saliva, breast milk, tears, urine, serum,
cerebrospinal fluid, and alveolar fluid.33 The most common modes of
transmission are through blood and blood product transfusions,34 intrave-
nous drug use,35 sexual intercourse,36 and perinatal transmission.37 The
most significant factors in predicting probability of HIV transmission are
the serological and clinical status of the individual, 38 type of exposure,39
30. Joanna L. Weissman & Mildred Childers, Note, Constitutional Questions:
Mandatory Testing for AIDS Under Washington's AIDS Legislation, 24 GONZ. L. REv. 433,
439 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Jaffe, supra note 26, at 11.
33. Friedland & Klein, supra note 18, at 1132.
34. Id. at 1125. Two percent of adults and 12% of children with AIDS in the United
States were believed to have acquired the disease through blood transfusion, a small but
important proportion of the total number of cases through January, 1987. Id.
35. Id. at 1127. In 1987, intravenous drug users accounted for 25% of all cases of
AIDS in the United States. Intravenous drug use is distinguished from other intravenous
routes such as accidental needle-stick inoculations which usually occur among health care
workers. A single small inoculum carries a low risk of HIV infection. The rate of HIV
infection through needle-stick injuries, after subjects at risk of nonoccupational exposure
are excluded, is estimated at 1.3 to 3.9 per 1000. Id. at 1126-27.
36. Id. at 1128. In 1987, 74% of U.S. adults diagnosed with AIDS were homosexual
and bisexual men. Heterosexual transmission accounted for 1.7% of adult cases of AIDS,
but the number of heterosexual transmissions was projected to increase by more than eight
times the reported percentage in 1987 to approximately 10%. Id.
37. Id. at 1130.
HIV may be transmitted from infected women to their offspring by three possible
routes: to the fetus in utero through the maternal circulation, to the infant during
labor and delivery by inoculation or ingestion of blood and other infected fluids,
and to the infant shortly after birth through infected breast milk.
Id.
38. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., HIV Testing, Counseling, and Prophylaxis After Sexual
Assault, 18 JAMA 1436, 1436 (1994).
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number of exposures, and quantum of fluid involved in the exposure. 40
B. Testing Procedures and Reliability
A person who goes to a private physician or a clinic to be tested for
AIDS is actually not tested for AIDS because there is no AIDS test per
se.4 Rather, the two most commonly administered tests are designed to
detect HIV antibodies in the blood.42 Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infection is confirmed by a three-part protocol; with the Enzyme-Linked
Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test functioning as the initial screening
test. 3 The ELISA test was intentionally designed to be excessively sensi-
tive to the presence of HIV because it was developed primarily to safe-
guard the blood supply." If the first ELISA test is positive, the test is
administered a second time.45 The Western Blot' confirmatory test is
administered if both the first and second ELISA tests are positive be-
cause the Western Blot test is more accurate in ruling out false positive
results that often occur due to the sensitive nature of the ELISA screen-
ing test.
47
Unfortunately, neither the results of the ELISA test nor the Western
Blot test are one hundred percent accurate. 4" Due to the sensitive nature
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1436-37; see also Nancy Padian et al., Male-to-Female Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 JAMA 788,789 (1987) (finding that the total number
of exposures with an infected partner was a key factor in predicting male-to-female trans-
mission of HIV).
41. Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 Am. J.L. & MED. 33, 37-
38 (1990).
42. Id. at 38.
43. A sample of the patient's blood is applied to a cultured HIV protein material. A
reactant designed to detect the presence of HIV antibodies is then added and a color
change occurs. The technician then must determine if the intensity of the color change falls
above or below a certain criterion. If the sample falls below the criterion, it is interpreted
as negative. Id.
44. BENCHBOOK, supra note 23, at 17.
45. Id.
46. Paul H. MacDonald, AIDS, Rape, and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for
Mandatory AIDS Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1614 (1990). Western
Blot testing involves applying a sample of the suspect's blood onto special paper that has
been blotted with HIV protein components. The paper is treated with radioactive iso-
topes. When the paper is x-rayed, the presence of HIV antibodies can be detected. Id.
47. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 23, at 17. False positive tests are the result of the
overly sensitive nature of the ELISA test. It is possible for an individual who is not actu-
ally infected with HIV to test positive. Id.
48. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718,721 n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). "The predictive value
for seropositivity of an ELISA positive confirmed by a Western Blot has been estimated at
90.9% in a population in which the level of infection is .05%." Id. (citation omitted).
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of both tests, false positive results occur periodically.49 Even more dis-
turbing, however, is the possibility of a false negative. A false negative
result will occur if an HIV-positive person is tested during the window
period between initial HIV infection and the development of antibo-
dies.5 0 During this time, if the individual is infected with the disease, s/he
is fully capable of spreading the disease to others even though the virus
itself cannot be detected by any medical tests.51
1. Statiutory Testing Schemes
The legislature of every'state in the country has responded to the AIDS
crisis by enacting some type of AIDS-related legislation.52 Many state
legislatures enacted statutes designed to deal specifically with the con-
cerns of victims of sexual assault.53 The general purpose of these testing
schemes is to curb the spread of HIV54 by releasing the results of an
attacker's HIV test to the victim so that s/he may make lifestyle changes
to prevent infection of others. 5 Generally, the legislative testing schemes
differ in provisions regarding how test results must be obtained,56 who
may obtain the test results,57 and at what point in the criminal process a
sex offender will be tested.58 For example, Colorado and California allow
49. Investigation of false positive rates of enzyme immunoassays ranged from zero to
6.8%. Klemens B. Meyer & Stephen G. Pauker, Sounding Board, Screening for HIV: Can
We Afford the False Positive Rate?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 238, 238 (1987).
50. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 23, at 17.
51. Field, supra note 41, at 41.
52. See generally Larry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, Leg-
islative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 JAMA 1621 (1989) (characterizing
and reporting on AIDS-related legislative and regulatory policy in the United States).
53. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.015 (West 1992).
55. See id.; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. .730, para. 5/5-5-3(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
56. New York will not require that an alleged or convicted sex offender be tested nor
will the test results be released to anyone without the offender's informed consent. See
generally N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney 1993) (consenting to testing is always
necessary even in the criminal context of rape or other sex offenses); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.025(2) (West Supp. 1993).
57. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(g) (giving judge discretionary
power to determine if the test results will be revealed to anyone, including the victim).
58. See generally IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-10.6 (Bums 1994) (requiring convicted
sex offender to undergo HIV screening test); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 19203-E (West
Supp. 1993) (court will require a convicted sex offender to undergo HIV test if the victim
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) there is a significant risk of infection
and (2) offender will not give informed consent to section 19203-E(5)); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-43.1 (West 1994) (mandating testing of juveniles charged with or adjudicated de-
linquent for aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2.2 (West
1994) (mandating testing for a person convicted of, indicted for or formally charged with
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courts to order HIV testing of accused or indicted sex offenders and to
provide the results to victims.59 Washington mandates testing only after
the defendant is convicted of a specified sexual offense and then allows
the results to be distributed to the victims.' A few states will disclose the
results of the offender's HIV test to the victim only upon a showing of
compelling need or other similar standard.61
III. PRIOR LAW-CONSIDERATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
PRIVACY-BALANCING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL'S PRIVACY INTERESTS
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the validity of
mandatory HIV testing in any context, including mandatory testing for
alleged and convicted sex offenders. Several state courts and lower fed-
eral courts, however, have addressed the constitutionality of these stat-
utes.62 The most frequent challenges to these statutes are whether the
aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740 (Law. Co-op.
1993) (court will order the HIV test upon conviction if the conduct resulted in exposure to
certain bodily fluids of the offender); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (West Supp.
1993) (testing will occur after sentencing by order of the court); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-
2.(Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring HIV testing of convicted sex offenders); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-524(B) (West Supp. 1994) (permitting HIV testing of alleged attacker after
arraignment).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (Deering 1992) (requiring probable cause to believe
accused committed the offense and probable cause to believe transmission was possible);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.96 (Deering 1990) (disclosure is made to the victim);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-415 (West Supp. 1994) (test results are also disclosed to the
court); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.003(4) (West Supp. 1994) (mandating an HIV test
upon request of the victim; if the victim does not make such a request the court will require
an HIV test upon conviction); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-5 (Michie Supp. 1994) (disclosing
results to the court, penal institution and Department of Human Services in addition to the
victim); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5129(4) (West 1992) (victim automatically pro-
vided with attacker's test results); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-524(B) (West Supp. 1994)
(court may order HIV test after alleged attacker has been arraigned); TEX. CODE CRiM.
PROC. ANN. art. 21.31 (West Supp. 1994) (court may order the test or the victim may re-
quest the test); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-62 (Michie Supp. 1994) (the state's attorney may
request an HIV test be performed upon a person charged with certain offenses. A juvenile
must be either convicted or adjudicated to have committed the offense before the state's
attorney can request testing. Disclosure limited to the victim only).
60. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (West Supp. 1993).
61. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202 (1992) (test results may be disclosed to a victim
upon demonstration of compelling need); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101(11) (Supp. 1993)
(disclosure made pursuant to court order upon showing of good cause by the party seeking
the information).
62. See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 805 P.2d 200 (Wash. 1991) (reversing trial court's order
requiring HIV testing of convicted sex offender because test results were of no use in
corroborating testimony that assailant was infected with HIV prior to soliciting juvenile
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testing scheme constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and whether the disclosure
clauses violate an individual's right to privacy.
The Fourth Amendment is the primary mechanism for limiting govern-
ment intrusion into the privacy of individual citizens.63 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized an individual's right to privacy or "the
right to be [left] alone." I The Supreme Court recognized this right to be
one of "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man."65 When evaluating the validity of the various testing stat-
utes enacted around the country to determine by which constitutional
standard the statute should be judged, courts carefully examine the gov-
ernment's purpose in enacting the statute, the individual to be tested, and
the purpose for which the test results will be used.' Because the U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of a mandatory
prostitutes, thus the required compelling state interest in conducting the test was not pres-
ent); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing hospital did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of one of its nurses by requiring
him to submit the results of an HIV test to the hospital officials and then subsequently
firing him for failure to do so considering the highly regulated nature of the health care
industry); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990)
(upholding nonconsensual HIV test of prisoner because state's legitimate penological in-
terest in preventing spread of HIV throughout the prison population outweighed pris-
oner's diminished expectation of privacy); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Comm'ty Office of
Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.) (holding health services agency policy requiring testing
of certain employees invalid because government's purported compelling need to protect
the health of clients was unsubstantiated due to the extraordinary low risk of AIDS trans-
mission), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding constitutional mandatory HIV testing of a woman who bit a
bailiff as he attempted to remove her from a courtroom because state's interest in protect-
ing public safety employees outweighed woman's privacy interest); People v. Adams, 597
N.E.2d 547 (Ill. 1992) (holding mandatory HIV testing of prostitutes constitutional because
the statute served compelling state interest in protecting the public); State v. C.S., 583
N.E.2d 726 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding mandatory testing of an individual convicted of
possession of a hypodermic needle constitutional because state's interest in protecting pub-
lic health by preventing the spread of HIV among intravenous drug users is sufficiently
narrow); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding involuntary. HIV
testing of custodial parent suspected of having HIV infection as a condition of awarding
custody invalid absent a compelling need to know); People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (upholding involuntary HIV testing of a convicted rapist because vic-
tim's mental anguish and suffering is greater than the minimal intrusion upon offender
caused by the routine drawing of blood).
63. See JomN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 14.26, at
757 (4th ed. 1991).
64. Id. at 758.
65. Id.
66. See infra part III.A.2.a.
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HIV testing statute, the lower courts have been left to decide these issues
based on analogies between HIV testing and a variety of other blood and
urinalysis testing cases decided by the Supreme Court.
A. The Development of the Fourth Amendment Analyses: A
Deterioration of the Probable Cause Requirement
The Fourth Amendment provides that all people have the right "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures., 67 The Fourth Amendment does not.absolutely
prohibit the government from conducting a search of an individual or an
individual's papers, home, or effects. According to the text of the Fourth
Amendment, the government may conduct a search if the court issues a
warrant "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation., 6 The
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard personal
privacy and dignity against unreasonable government interference. 69 The
government need not always obtain a warrant for a search to be constitu-
tional; the courts will uphold a warrantless search if the government can
prove that the search was "reasonable. 70
Before the court can evaluate the reasonableness of the government's
action, the court must first determine whether the government action
constitutes a "search." In Schmerber v. California,71 the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a blood test to determine blood-
alcohol content constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.72 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan found that a
blood test "plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment" because the essence of the Fourth
Amendment is to ensure that people are secure in their persons.73
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. Id.
69. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
70. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(holding warrantless blood and urinalysis tests of certain employees reasonable); National
ITeasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding warrantless pre-
employment urinalysis testing of certain Customs Service employees reasonable due to the
highly sensitive nature of the positions); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding
warrantless search of probationer's home reasonable in light of special needs of the proba-
tion system); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding warrantless search of
student's purse by the vice principal reasonable due to school official's legitimate need to
maintain a proper learning environment).
71. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
72. Id. at 767.
73. Id.
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The Supreme Court generally has categorized a "search" as any gov-
ernment intrusion that jeopardizes a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.74 Because the current methods of testing for and confirming the
presence of HIV is through the administration of two blood tests,75 the
tests would both constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.76
The government's purpose in conducting the search and the means by
which the blood test is conducted must be "reasonable" for the test to be
constitutionally valid.77 The court determines the reasonableness of the
search by weighing the degree of intrusiveness of the search upon the
subject's Fourth Amendment privacy interests against the government's
asserted interests in conducting the search.78 A court's willingness to find
a search to be "reasonable" depends heavily on the government's pur-
pose in conducting the search. Depending on the purpose of the search,
it will be categorized as an evidentiary search, an administrative search,
or a "special needs" search.79 The judicial standards governing each type
of search are discussed below.
1. Evidentiary Searches Under the Fourth Amendment The
Probable Cause Requirement
Searches by law-enforcement officers to procure evidence generally re-
quire a warrant based on probable cause unless the intrusion is so mini-
mal and the circumstances so. urgent that waiver of the warrant
requirement is justified8s However, the courts apply a strict standard of
74. Id. Justice Harlan enunciated a two-part test to aid in determining whether a
search fell within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. The person must have a
subjective expectation of privacy and the expectation must be recognized by society as
being reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1987) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Harlan's test was applied to blood tests by the Supreme Court in Skinner, there the Court
found it was "obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath t he skin, infringes
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Skinner, 489
U.S. at 616.
75. See supra part II.B.
76. See also Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining as an invalid
search and seizure the HIV testing of two blood samples drawn from appellant who bit two
police officers).
77. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
78. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
79. David Kennon Moody, AIDS and Rape: The Constitutional Dimension of
Mandatory Testing of Sex Offenders, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 238, 247 (1990).
80. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701-03 (1983). See generally Schmerber,
384 U.S. 757 (holding involuntary blood test of person suspected of drunk driving reason-
able because test was minimally intrusive and time delay would risk losing the evidence
forever). But cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding involuntary surgery to re-
1994]
294 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:281
reasonableness to warrantless evidentiary searches which implicate sub-
stantial bodily intrusions."1 For example, in Winston v. Lee,82 the Court
focused on the question of whether the community's need to appropriate
evidence in a manner that posed a substantial intrusion upon the rights of
the individual to be searched outweighed the individual's privacy inter-
ests. 3 The Court preserved the requirement of probable cause because
of the intrusive nature of the search. Human Immunodeficiency Virus
testing schemes may fit within the evidentiary search category if the test is
conducted to ascertain whether criminal charges, such as attempted mur-
der, can be brought against the accused individual.' Those cases are dis-
tinguishable from HIV-assault cases because the primary purpose of
testing in HIV-assault cases is to provide the victim with information
about the assailant's HIV status so that the victim may receive proper
medical treatment and make necessary life-style adjustments.8 5
The nature and purpose of Washington's mandatory HIV testing stat-
ute appears to eliminate the statute from analysis under the law enforce-
ment purposes test.' Indeed, the Washington statute does not sanction
move bullet from suspected robber unreasonable because of intrusive nature of the
procedure).
81. See generally Winston, 470 U.S. 753. The Court emphasized that some bodily in-
trusions are so great that they may be unreasonable even if there is probable cause to
believe the search will yield evidence of a crime. Id. at 759.
82. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
83. Id. at 759.
84. See Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (convicting an HIV-posi-
tive defendant who spit on a prison guard of attempted murder); Scroggins v. State, 401
S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding evidence against an HIV-positive defendant who
bit an officer responding to a domestic disturbance was sufficient to sustain a conviction of
assault with intent to commit murder); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (using fact that defendant was HIV positive to convict defendant of attempted mur-
der when he sprayed his blood into the eyes and mouth of a police officer during an at-
tempted suicide).
85. See Johnetta v. San Francisco, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
testing of defendant's blood valid under California's Proposition 96, which allows HIV
testing in situations where there is probable cause to believe infected bodily fluids may
have been transferred to a peace officer so that precautions can be taken to preserve his/
her health and the health of others).
86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.015. After finding that incidence of sexually
transmitted disease was rising rapidly and resulting in serious "social, health, and economic
costs, including infant and maternal mortality, temporary and lifelong disability, and pre-
mature death," the legislature set out the purpose of Washington's HIV testing scheme as
follows: "It is therefore the intent of the legislature to provide a program that is suffi-
ciently flexible to meet emerging needs, deals efficiently and effectively with reducing the
incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, and provides patients with a secure knowledge
that information they provide will remain private and confidential." Id.
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the use of the test results as evidence of a crime against an offender. 87
The primary purpose of mandatory testing is to protect the public health,
therefore, mandatory testing statutes must be examined under the
Supreme Court's special needs standard. However, the Winston standard
may be the most appropriate standard of analysis considering the sub-
stantial intrusion HIV testing can have on the lives of the victim and the
tested sex offender. 88
2. Special Needs Administrative Searches Under the Fourth
Amendment
The standard of analysis used by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluat-
ing the validity of administrative searches marks the beginning of a judi-
cial trend toward eliminating the probable cause requirement of a
reasonable search in non-exigent circumstances. Government searches to
enforce regulatory health or safety codes are most often classified as ad-
ministrative searches.89 Originally, the Supreme Court required govern-
ment officials to obtain a warrant based on probable cause for an
administrative search to be valid in a non-emergency situation?0 Neces-
sity has caused the Supreme Court to move the focus of analysis away
from the probable cause requirement in cases of administrative searches
because the conditions triggering most evidentiary searches are usually
not present in the circumstances of an administrative search.9' The "spe-
cial needs" doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court to assess the
validity of administrative searches.'
a. The "Special Needs" Doctrine
The Court developed the "special needs" doctrine to address those sit-
uations where a warrant and the probable cause standard would be inap-
87. See In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 458 (Wash. 1993).
88. See infra part V.A..b.
89. Examples of administrative searches include searches of businesses, see New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that searches of junkyards fall under administrative
search guideline because they are closely regulated businesses), and residences, see
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that warrantless
searches pursuant to housing code inspections are permissible if appropriate person gives
consent). It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never held that a search of a
person constitutes an administrative search. Moody, supra note 79, at 248 n.75.
90. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525 (holding Fourth Amendment bars warrantless administra-
tive searches of a personal residence where the government inspector has been denied
entry by the occupant).
91. See Sadler, supra note 3, at 201.
92. See id.
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propriate considering the circumstances of the search.93 "Special needs"
arise when the search is conducted for reasons "beyond the normal need
for law enforcement."94 Special needs searches occur when the govern-
ment's interest in conducting the search is protecting public safety, rather
than procuring evidence to be used in criminal prosecution.95 In those
cases where the court finds that special needs exist, the court will assess
the propriety of the warrantless search by balancing the government's
need to conduct a warrantless search against the privacy interests of the
individual that were invaded by the warrantless search.96 Generally, the
Court will uphold warrantless special needs searches if the government
can show that its interests so substantially outweigh the individual's al-
ready diminished expectation of privacy that a warrant is unnecessary. 97
The Supreme Court first recognized the validity of a warrantless ad-
ministrative search in New York v. Burger.98 The Court found the war-
rantless search reasonable because the junk industry was traditionally
heavily regulated and thus, individual's involved in a pervasively regu-
lated industry had a decreased expectation of privacy.99 The Court for-
mulated a three-part reasonableness test to determine what types of
warrantless administrative searches would withstand Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. First, the government must show that a substantial state interest
underlies the regulatory scheme and therefore justifies the search."° The
government then must show that the regulatory scheme requires warrant-
less inspections to be effective. 101 Finally, the certainty and regularity of
the application of the inspection program must be such that it acts as an
adequate substitute for a search warrant.0 2
The Court extended the reach of the "special needs" doctrine to
searches of persons in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion10 3 and its companion case, National Treasury Employees Union v.
93. See id. at 201 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)).
94. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 619.
97. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
98. 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding the warrantless inspection of a junkyard).
99. Id. at 700.
100. Id. at 702.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 703. This last requirement is effectively a notice requirement and is satisfied
if it alerts a party that they may be subject to a search. At the same time, the government
must limit the time, place, and scope of the search. Id.
103. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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Von Raab."° These cases are significant because they signify the Court's
elimination of the probable cause requirement from the Fourth Amend-
ment administrative search framework. 10 5 In both Skinner and Von
Raab, the Court held that the warrant requirement and the need for indi-
vidualized' suspicion were not prerequisites to a reasonable, warrantless
administrative search of one's person."°
The Court in Skinner upheld regulations requiring mandatory, warrant-
less blood and urine testing to detect the presence of drug and alcohol in
employees involved in railroad accidents. 7 The Court found that be-
cause railroad employees occupied positions in which they were responsi-
ble for public safety, drug or alcohol use posed an immediate and serious
threat to the public welfare. 08 Consequently, the government's need to
conduct warrantless drug and alcohol tests justified the privacy intrusions
suffered by those employees who were tested.'0
9
The warrant requirement protects privacy interests by assuring citizens
that the proposed intrusion has been scrutinized by a neutral magistrate
and that it is limited in its scope and objectives." 0 The Court in Skinner
determined that a warrant requirement would not have furthered these
goals. The Court found that the interposition of a neutral magistrate was
unnecessary because the railroad authorities did not have a great deal of
discretion in deciding who would be tested."" Furthermore, the govern-
ment regulations narrowly defined the circumstances justifying toxicolog-
ical testing' and the limits of the intrusion. 1 2  The Court gave
considerable deference to the fact that the burden inherent in obtaining a
warrant would frustrate the governmental purpose of the search."13
The Skinner Court also negated the requirement of individualized sus-
picion in circumstances where the privacy interests intruded upon by the
104. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
105. Moody, supra note 79, at 250.
106. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
107. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. The Court found that statistical evidence, presented by
the Federal Railroad Administration substantiated the need for drug and alcohol testing.
Id. at 632.
108. Id. at 628-29.
109. Id. at 634. The record was replete with evidence documenting the pervasiveness of
drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees. Id. at 607-08.
110. Id. at 622.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Id. at' 623. The Court noted that "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the
bloodstream at a constant rate," and, therefore, any delay in procuring a warrant could
result in the loss of evidence. Id.
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search are minimal and where the important governmental interests justi-
fying the search would be jeopardized by requiring a showing of individu-
alized suspicion." 4 The individualized suspicion requirement threatened
the very interests that the government's testing scheme sought to protect.
In Von Raab, the Court upheld the warrantless drug testing of U.S.
Customs Service employees who were applying for certain positions be-
cause the government had a "compelling interest in preventing the pro-
motion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity
of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry.""' 5 The government's
interest in protecting its citizens and the integrity of its borders substan-
tially outweighed the privacy interests of the customs officials.' 1 6
Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving
mandatory HIV testing, a few federal and state courts have considered
the issue and have applied the "special needs" doctrine. 17
. B. The Substantive Right to Privacy
The reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment warrantless search is
based upon a weighing of the government's compelling interests and the
114. Id. at 624. Prior to Skinner, the Court held that blood tests did not present a
significant intrusion upon an individual's privacy because the quantity of blood extracted is
minimal and the pain and trauma incident to the test is virtually non-existent. Id. at 625
(citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). The Court also recognized that rail-
road employees have a diminished expectation of privacy in information relating to their
physical condition by virtue of the fact that they work in a pervasively regulated industry
that has an obvious interest in the physical condition of its employees. Id. at 627-28.
115. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
116. Id. It is important to note that the government did not present any statistical
proof to substantiate the need for the drug testing policy as it had in Skinner.
I joined the Court's opinion [in Skinner] because the demonstrated frequency of
drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated
connection between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable
means of protecting society. I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present
case because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or
even likely.
Id. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See State v. Farmer, 805 P.2d 200 (Wash. 1991) (persons convicted of soliciting
juvenile prostitutes); Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant bit police
officers); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990)
(HIV testing of hospital employees); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989) (pris-
oners); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Comm'ty Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.
1989) (health-care providers); Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (person charged with interfering with the official duties of public safety em-
ployees); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992) (prostitutes); People v. C.S., 583
N.E.2d 726 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (convicted intravenous drug users); People v. Thomas, 529
N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (convicted sex offender).
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search-subject's right to privacy.'1 ' There also exists a substantive consti-
tutional right to privacy that encompasses two types of privacy: the right
to confidentiality in intimate personal information and the right to make
autonomous decisions." 9 Although HIV testing implicates both privacy
rights, the issue of informational privacy is more heavily contested.
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that the right to privacy limits the
collection of data on private individuals by the government.' 20 In Whalen
v. Roe,' 21 the Court upheld a New York drug registration statute that
required the state to develop a list of persons taking certain prescription
drugs.' 22 The purpose of the statute was to control illegal distribution of
prescription drugs."2 While stopping short of finding that a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy existed, the Court noted that the
government's duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure of the collected infor-
mation limited the government's right to collect data.
1 24
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists,125 the Court refined its theory on informational privacy to require
that restrictions on an individual's right to privacy be reasonably related
to the state's asserted compelling interests so as not to deter the exercise
of valid constitutional rights.' 26 The Thornburgh Court invalidated a stat-
utory provision that made information available for public inspection that
could potentially identify a woman who had undergone an abortion. 27
The Court found that the statute placed a restriction on a woman's right
to an abortion which was not reasonably related to the state's asserted
118. See supra part III.
119. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 462 (Wash. 1993).
120. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at 807.
121. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
122. Id. at 603-04.
123. Id. at 591-92.
124. Id. at 605-06. Justice Brennan noted in his concurring opinion that if the govern-
ment did not carefully limit the use of the collected information, the government was run-
ning the risk of depriving individuals of their constitutionally protected privacy interest.
Id. at 606-07.
125. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). In Thornburgh the Court invalidated a number of state regu-
lations that restricted a woman's right to have an abortion because they were not reason-
ably related to the state's compelling interests in protecting the potential life of the fetus
and the life of the mother. Id. at 766. The records that the physicians were required to
keep included an extraordinary amount of information on the women. The Court found
that the requirement that such information be included was not a reasonable means of
achieving the state's goal in deterring abortions. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at
807-08.
126. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 767.
127. Id. at 766-67.
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compelling interest in protecting the health of women.128 While not spe-
cifically addressing whether governmental data collection was limited by
an individual's right to privacy, the majority did refer to the Whalen prop-
osition that "a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
largely beyond the reach of government."'1 29
C. The Right to Privacy in Autonomous Decision-Making
Mandatory HIV testing statutes also implicate the autonomous deci-
sion-making branch of the constitutional right to privacy. The Court con-
siders the right to make autonomous decisions in areas of procreation,
marriage, and abortion to be a "fundamental right."' 0 Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court has held that the government must demonstrate a
compelling state interest in restricting or invading the individual's privacy
and that the means used by the state are narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.' 3 ' Therefore, any state law purporting to restrict an individual's
right to make such autonomous decisions must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.' 32
In Zablocki v. Redhail,133 the Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin
law prohibiting a resident with minor children from marrying if the resi-
dent owed outstanding support obligations to his or her minor chil-
dren.3 The purpose of the statute was to serve as a collection device. 35
However, the Court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to
achieve this purpose because it limited marriage and failed to address
other financial obligations that the parent might assume which would
similarly prevent the individual from supporting his or her children.'36
The statute was also overbroad because it did not provide any exceptions
for residents whose financial situations would be improved by a subse-
quent marriage, thus putting the resident in a better position to make
128. Id. at 766.
129. Id. at 772 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1976)).
130. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (abortion);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(sterilization).
131. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986).
132. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at 780-81.
133. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
134. Id. at 377.
135. See id. at 375 n.1.
136. Id. at 390.
HJV Testing of Sex Offenders
support payments.' 37 The Court has held on numerous occasions that a
government regulation cannot unduly burden a fundamental right of an
individual; when government regulation does burden a fundamental
right, the government must use the least intrusive means available to
achieve its interests. 38
IV. ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON'S MANDATORY TESTING SCHEME AS
APPLIED IN In the Matter of Juveniles A, B, C, D, E
A. Facts
In re Juveniles139 involved five juveniles who were found by the
Whatcom County commissioner to have committed various sexual of-
fenses on separate occasions. The Commissioner then ordered the juve-
nile offenders to submit to HIV testing pursuant to Washington's
mandatory HIV testing statute.' 4°
Juvenile "A," a fourteen-year-old male, was found to have taken inde-
cent liberties through forcible compulsion with a younger boy when he
held down the victim and sodomized him.' 4 ' Juvenile "B," a fourteen-
year-old male, pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation. While "B"
was alone with a four-year-old girl, he "kissed her on her breast, laid on
top of her . . .removed her pants and licked and kissed her vaginal
area."' 42 An original allegation that penetration occurred was later de-
nied.' 43 Juvenile "C," a fifteen-year-old girl, pleaded guilty to three
counts of first degree child molestation.'" She allowed a five-year-old
boy to lie on top of her while both were fully clothed.14 5 She let him kiss
her on the mouth, touch her breast, and look inside her underwear.'
46
Other allegations made against her included touching the penis of a
young boy on several different occasions; fondling a four-year-old girl in
137. Id.
138. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding bodily invasion unreasonable
because other evidence could be obtained to convict defendant); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1989) (holding right to marry could not be restricted due to existence of
back child support payments because the government had other more appropriate means
of getting support paid).
139. 847 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1993).
140. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (West 1992).
141. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 456.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
19941
302 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:281
the genital area by scratching herself in the genital area, and then placing
her hand inside the victim's underwear; and touching the penis of a young
boy she was baby-sitting.147 Juvenile "D," a sixteen-year-old male,
pleaded guilty to indecent liberties when he touched the breasts and geni-
tal area of an eleven-year-old female. 4 Additionally, the victim of Juve-
nile "D" alleged that Juvenile "D" removed his clothes and the victim's
clothes and then proceeded to rub his genitals and hands against the vic-
tim's genitals.' 49 Finally, Juvenile "E," a fifteen-year-old male, pleaded
guilty to first degree child molestation. On three separate occasions dur-
ing the evening, "E" placed his mouth on the penis of a seven-year-old
boy he was baby-sitting.150
After the pleas of juveniles "B," "C," "D," and "E" were entered, and
upon a court finding that juvenile "A" committed indecent liberties upon
a younger boy, the State sought orders from the juvenile court compelling
the five juvenile offenders to be tested for HIV pursuant to the state
mandatory testing statute.15 ' Appellants' opposition to the statute was
heard by a hearing commissioner who upheld the constitutionality of the
statute.' 2 The commissioner's order directing HIV testing of the appel-
lants was issued, but was stayed pending review by the appellate division.
The Supreme Court of Washington accepted the appellate court's certifi-
cation of the case.' 53
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the constitutionality of the
mandatory testing scheme as applied to these five juveniles, finding that
the HIV test did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure because
"substantial governmental interests [were] served by testing and disclo-
sure of those test results to a limited group of people [that] eclipse[d] the
defendants' interest in preventing the search" and that the testing did not
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; The Washington statute provides, "[liocal health departments authorized
under this chapter shall conduct or cause to be conducted pre-test counseling, HIV testing,
and post-test counseling of all persons: Convicted of a sexual offense under chapter 9A.44
RCW." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340(1)(a) (West 1992).
152. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 456. Commissioner Morrow found that the statute
comported with both the Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy. Id.
153. Id. at 457.
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violate any of the defendants' privacy interests.154
V. UPHOLDING MANDATORY HIV TESTING: THE IRRATIONAL
RELATION BETWEEN THE STATE'S INTERESTS AND THE
MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEM.
A. Fourth Amendment: Eliminating the Probable Cause Requirement
After concluding that HIV testing implicates the Fourth Amendment,
the In re Juveniles majority employed the analytical framework of the
"special needs" test enunciated in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association'55 as the appropriate doctrine for analyzing nonconsensual
HIV testing.'5 6 The court found that the HIV testing scheme constituted
a special need because the testing was performed pursuant to a health
and safety regulation and not to the criminal code; the individuals were
not being tested to find evidence of a crime; the results of the tests did
not place the parties in danger of having new charges brought against
them or extending their already existing sentences; and the requirement
of individualized suspicion was impracticable because HIV-infected indi-
viduals rarely exhibit outward manifestations of infection.' 57
The majority's application of the "special needs" doctrine is erroneous
because it fails to reflect a full understanding of the special needs analysis
developed by the Court in Skinner and Von Raab.5 s Unlike the testing
regulations present in Skinner and Von Raab, it cannot be said that the
Washington testing statute is so narrowly defined that there is no need for
the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. In fact, the statute man-
dates testing of criminal defendants who perpetrate crimes that present
154. Id. at 463. The juvenile court's application of the statute to juveniles was upheld
by the Washington Supreme Court which found that to exclude juveniles from the scope of
the mandatory HIV testing statutes would violate the legislative intent of the statute. Id. at
458-59. The purpose of the statute is to help stop the spread of sexually transmitted dis-
eases, including AIDS, through testing and disclosure of the test results to certain individu-
als. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.015 (West 1992). It is important to note that another
asserted purpose of the statute, to preserve the confidentiality of the test results, is in com-
plete and irreconcilable opposition to the former purpose. See id. § 70.24.340(1) (a) (West
1992).
155. 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
156. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 460. "For searches outside the criminal context, the
Supreme Court has developed the 'special needs' doctrine .... Numerous courts have
found the special needs doctrine to be appropriate when analyzing nonconsensual HIV
testing." Id. at 459.
157. Id. at 459-60.
158. Id. at 464 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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no risk of transmitting the HIV infection.15 9
The government is only permitted to conduct warrantless searches
under the aegis of the "special needs" exception if the government can
demonstrate that a warrant and probable cause requirement are impracti-
cal." A warrant may be impractical in situations where the passage of
time imperils the goal of the government's search thus jeopardizing its
interest in conducting the search. 161 The same rationale does not apply to
searches conducted to detect the presence of HIV, however, because
once HIV enters the bloodstream and antibodies develop, the "evidence"
remains with the individual forever. 162 Hence, the passage of time will
not diminish the presence of the virus beyond detection. 63 In Barlow v.
Ground,"64 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
police violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized two blood sam-
ples from a man who bit them as they attempted to take him into cus-
tody.165 The court was primarily concerned with the propriety of testing
the defendant because insufficient scientific evidence existed to prove
that HIV can be transmitted through saliva.' 66 The court also found that
neither the undue delay exception nor the exigent circumstances excep-
tion applied because "[a] slight delay in testing [would] not lead to the
destruction of the information sought" because HIV antibodies, once de-
159. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44 (West 1993).
160. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Judge Utter, in his dissent in In re
Juveniles, points out that the mandatory drug testing in Skinner was not upheld "merely
because of the grave need to ensure public safety, but rather because warrant and probable
cause requirements would have been impractical under the circumstances." In re Juveniles,
847 P.2d at 464 (Utter, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
161. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
'fTeasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966). In all these cases the Court recognized that a warrant requirement was
unreasonable because any delay in conducting the search could potentially destroy the
evidence the government was seeking.
162. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2995
(1992).
163. Jaffe, supra note 26, at 10. The nature of the AIDS virus is such that it permeates
the genetic material of the cells by transcribing its genetic material from RNA to DNA, the
genetic material of humans.
Once this "transcription" step has taken place, this DNA copy containing the
virus's genetic material can then integrate or become part of the host cell ....
This kind of cellular life-style has some very important implications. First, once
individuals are infected with HIV, they remain infected, presumably for the rest
of their lives.
Id.
164. 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2995 (1992).
165. Id. at 1137.
166. Id. at 1138-39.
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veloped, do not leave a person's blood.167
Under the Washington testing scheme, an individual is not tested for
HIV until convicted of a sexual offense.' 68 Depending on the length of
the pre-trial process and the trial itself, considerable time can elapse be-
tween the sexual offense and conviction. The possibility that the perpe-
trator may have contracted HIV subsequent to the assault of the victim
presents a compelling argument for requiring a probable cause inquiry to
assess the possibility of transmission prior to mandating testing.' 69
Ironically, the Washington legislature includes a standard of review
provision similar to a probable cause inquiry in the section of the HIV
testing statute dealing with occupational exposure to the disease. 70
Under this provision, the court will only order testing if the facts reveal a
possible risk of HIV transmission.' 7' It seems highly unlikely that the
legislature is less concerned with the health of possibly exposed municipal
employees than the health of victims of sexual assault. Therefore, the
only logical conclusion is that the legislature recognized that testing may
not be reasonable in all situations because not all contacts between indi-
viduals pose a risk of HIV transmission.
If the conduct between the victim and the perpetrator presents no sci-
entifically-proven risk of transmission, testing the perpetrator will only
produce inaccurate and misleading test results that needlessly exacerbate
the fears of a victim who has already suffered a tremendously traumatic
experience. The Washington HIV testing statute requires testing of sex
offenders who commit offenses that pose a negligible risk of transmis-
sion. 172 Therefore, the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate should
167. Id. at 1138. The exigent circumstances exception did not apply to the search be-
cause the "officers could not decrease or increase the risk to their health" by testing the
defendant immediately. Id. at 1139.
168. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (1)(a) (West 1992).
169. The Washington code includes a provision for HIV testing of individuals who ex-
pose certain municipal employees, including law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and
health care providers, to a substantial amount of bodily fluids. If the individual refuses
voluntary testing, the exposed worker may petition the court to order testing. The stan-
dard of review for the order requires the court to look at "whether substantial exposure
occurred and whether that exposure presents a possible risk of transmission." Id.
§ 70.24.340(4).
170. Id.
171. Id. California, which has one of the most liberal mandatory testing statutes, re-
quires a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that HIV
could have been transferred from the accused to the victim. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1
(Deering 1992).
172. See generally supra note 8. Acts that encompass the crimes of child molestation,
sexual misconduct with a minor, and indecent liberties do not necessarily involve acts that
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be required to ensure that the search is justified by a governmental need
to test the offender.
1. Individualized Suspicion and Fourth Amendment Balancing:
Placing Fear and Ignorance Above the Right to Be Secure in
One's Person
The Court in Skinner held that even if a warrant and probable cause
requirement were impracticable, evidence of individualized suspicion is
required unless the government's interest in testing outweighs the indi-
vidual's privacy interests. 173 In In re Juveniles, the majority's application
of the balancing test misses the mark created by the Court in Skinner.
Ultimately, the majority's balancing approach in In re Juveniles grossly
overstates the government's compelling need to test the offenders and
drastically minimizes the privacy interests of the offender that are impli-
cated by the testing procedure. The court, relying upon this faulty analy-
sis, concludes that the state's need to compel HIV testing of sex offenders
outweighs the individual's privacy interests. 1 74 However, a cursory inves-
tigation of the court's rationale suggests that little scientific evidence ex-
ists to support this conclusion.
a. The State's Compelling Interests
The court's finding that the state's interests in mandatory testing are
compelling is, at best, dubious. The court finds that the state has compel-
ling interests in combating the spread of AIDS, protecting the rights of
victims, aiding officials involved in prison and probation management,
and aiding sex offenders by providing pre- and post-test counseling and
giving them information that will assist them in altering their behavior.
175
i. Combating the Spread of AIDS
The court recognized the state's compelling interest in exercising its
police power to control communicable diseases, including AIDS, but'the
court does not evaluate how section 70.24.340 achieves this goal.1 76 Due
to the inaccuracy of currently available HIV tests, this goal is impossible
could potentially transmit HIV. Child molestation, for example, includes fondling of a
child's genitals, an act that usually does not include an exchange of bodily fluids. See supra
part II.A.2.
173. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
174. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 463 (Wash. 1993).
175. Id. at 460-61.
176. Id. at 460.
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to achieve through mandatory testing of the offender.177 A negative test
result of a sex offender might instill in the victim a false sense of security
because it is possible that the offender may be infected and capable of
infecting others without having developed the antibodies that the ELISA
and Western Blot tests are designed to detect. 178 Thus, the testing
scheme may work against the legislature's stated intention of controlling
the spread of HIV by enabling an infected victim, who believes that s/he
is not infected because his/her attacker tested negative, to transmit HIV
to others.
The best way to prevent the spread of HIV by the victim, and to help
the victim make important lifestyle choices in the least intrusive manner
is to test the victim for HIV and provide counseling for the victim. The
victim's right to-accurate medical information about his/her own health is
far more compelling and reasonable than the right to have the offender
tested.
ii. State's Interest in Protecting the Rights of Victims
The court recognizes a victim's right to know the HIV status of the
offender so that s/he may use the information to obtain proper medical
treatment. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the state's interest in
helping to relieve the "mental anguish suffered by victims"' 179 of sexual
assaults. The use of mandatory HIV testing to achieve these goals is
problematic.
First, if there is no evidence suggesting that behavior capable of trans-
mitting the disease occurred,18° then the rationale for testing offenders is
misplaced. The dissent notes that the state's interest in protecting the
victim would be compelling in those cases where "there was a possibility
of infection, as in the case where there was probable cause to believe
there was a transmission of bodily fluids."1 81
177. See supra part II.B.
178. BENCHBOOK, supra note 23, at 10, 17; Field, supra note 41, at 41. Although it is
true that Washington tests the offenders after they have been convicted and a significant
amount of time may have elapsed since the contact between victim and assailant took
place, there is medical evidence that indicates it may take years for HIV antibodies to
develop. BENCHBOOK, supra note 23, at 17.
179. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 461.
180. See supra part II.A.2.
181. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 466. The dissent also noted that there is no more need
to test a convicted sex offender whose conduct does not pose a significant risk of transmis-
sion for HIV than there is to test "an automobile thief whose offense poses no possibility of
HIV infection." Id. (Utter, J., dissenting).
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Second, recent scientific experimentation has disproved the prophylac-
tic effects of AZT.182 Moreover, because of the possible harsh side-ef-
fects associated with the drug, many physicians are unwilling to treat
patients with AZT unless the patient has tested positive for the virus.'83
Finally, current medical technology has not produced a completely ac-
curate HIV test.184 A positive test result will undoubtedly exacerbate the
fears and anxieties of the victim, perhaps needlessly. Due to the less than
one hundred percent reliability of HIV antibody tests currently available,
there is a statistically significant chance that an offender who is not in-
fected will test positive for HIV.185 Even if the offender is HIV positive,
the likelihood of transmitting the virus to the victim through one contact
is low.'86 The possibility that the offender was infected subsequent to his
contact with the victim becomes greater as more time elapses between
the initial assault and the testing, thus increasing the chance that the of-
fender did not expose the victim to the virus at the time of the attack."8
The above stated reasons diminish the state's compelling interest in test-
ing the offender because testing does not necessarily elicit reliable infor-
mation upon which the victim could make any. rational choices
concerning life-style changes or medical treatment.
iii. The State's Interest in Effective Prison and Probation
Management
The majority asserts that the state's interest in effective prison and pro-
182. "AZT" is an acronym for azidothymidine which is an antiretroviral drug used to
slow down the progression of symptoms associated with HIV infection. MEDICAL Eco-
NOMICS Co. INC., PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 778 (45th ed. 1991); see also Marsha F.
Goldsmith, HIVIAIDS Early Treatment Controversy Cues New Advice but Questions Re-
main, 270 JAMA 295, 295-96 (1993).
183. Gostin, supra note 38, at 1439.
184. See Meyer & Pauker, supra note 49; see also Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S. 2d 718, 721
n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
185. MacDonald, supra note 46, at 1614-16. Additionally, compelling studies of the
accuracy of HIV testing exist which indicate that the rate of false positive results increase
as the number of low-risk people tested increases. Id. at 1616 n.81. The ELISA test was
initially developed as a method of testing the blood supply donated at blood banks. As a
result, the line between positive and negative results is drawn conservatively in order to
afford greater protection of the blood supply againsi HIV. Mary C. Morgan, The Problems
of Testing for HIV in the Criminal Courts, 29 JUDGES' J. 22, 67 (Spring 1990).
186. Friedland & Klein, supra note 18, at 1129. In a study conducted by the Surgeon
General of 750 health care workers, all of whom had been exposed to the bodily fluids of
patients through spills or needle sticks, only three tested positive for HIV. Morgan, supra
note 185, at 67.
187. Morgan, supra note 185, at 67.
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bation management is achieved by mandatory HIV testing because it al-
lows the state to alert prison officials of the sex offender's HIV status so
proper precautions can be taken to guard against the spread of the dis-
ease and so proper medical care for the offender can be arranged. 88 The
efficient prison management justification is, however, highly suspect. As
the dissent points out, "the testing authorized by [the Washington testing
statute] is not associated in any fashion with incarceration."' 8 9 The illogi-
cal nature of the majority's assertion is emphasized by the fact that this
statute only pertains to testing of convicted sex offenders and not other
offenders entering the prison system who may also be infected with
HIV. 9°
iv. The State's Interest in Assisting Sexual Offenders Through
Counseling
Finally, the court finds that the state has an interest in providing pre-
and post-test counseling to sex offenders who test positive for HIV.191
This justification relates back to the government's interest in curbing the
spread of communicable diseases by providing counseling for the offend-
ers to help them modify their behavior.192 The dissent argues that to
achieve this goal, the state has no greater interest in testing sex offenders
than it does in testing all criminal offenders coming into the penal system
who would also need the same counseling as HIV positive sex offend-
ers.193 Thus, the state's interest in helping potentially HIV infected sex
offenders cannot be considered compelling unless mandatory testing of
all prisoners was implemented. 194
b. The Offender's Privacy Interests
The majority in In re Juveniles concludes that the state's interests out-
weigh the privacy interests asserted by the defendants.195 The court
comes to thisconclusion by using the Skinner balancing test which takes
into account the invasiveness of the proposed search and the expectation
of privacy of the searched individual. However, this evaluation falls short
188. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 461 (Wash. 1993).
189. Id. at 467.
190. Id. at 467 n.3.
191. Id. at 461.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 467.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 460.
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of considering the social realities of AIDS. The majority states that in
several opinions the Supreme Court has concluded that the impact of a
blood test upon an individual's privacy interests is minimal.196 While it
may be true that the physical act of drawing blood from an individual
presents no great risk or trauma, the Washington Supreme Court ne-
glected to consider the enormous psychological and social impact a posi-
tive test will have on an individual." Medical studies cite a plethora of
psychological disorders associated with learning that one is HIV-positive,
ranging from depression and paranoia to suicide, that lend strong support
to the proposition that focusing solely on the immediate physical risk of
drawing blood is short-sighted.19 The dissent points out that AIDS is
associated with myriad devastating social consequences including em-
ployment and housing discrimination which, along with the psychological
impact of AIDS, make a strong case for applying stricter standards of
analysis to issues involving AIDS than the majority used in this case.' 99
The In re Juveniles majority also notes that the privacy interests of an
individual who is convicted of a crime are more limited than the privacy
196. Id. In support of this conclusion the majority cites the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985), stating that blood testing is considered a rea-
sonable bodily intrusion because it is "society's judgment that blood tests do not constitute
an unduly extensive imposition of an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity." In
re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 460. Other courts have interpreted the Court's ruling in Skinner to
affirm the contention that blood testing should not be afforded the same amount of fourth
amendment protection as other bodily intrusions. See Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 267
Cal. Rptr. 666, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Recently, however, some lower state courts have
started to consider the impact HIV testing on an individual's life and rejected requests to
test an individual based on psychological impact a positive result has on an infected indi-
vidual and societal reaction to an individual who is HIV-positive. See Doe v. Roe, 526
N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (refusing request by grandparents involved in custody
dispute to have their grandchild's father tested for HIV).
197. Some courts have compared the impact of learning that one is HIV-positive with
receiving the death penalty. Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 722. See also Glover v. Eastern Neb.
Comm'ty Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 248 (D. Neb 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 461
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
198. Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons With AIDS, 259
JAMA 1333 (1988). The study concluded that "the rate of suicide in persons with AIDS is
substantially higher than equivalent age- and gender-specific rates of the general popula-
tion .... Men aged 20 to 59 years with a diagnosis of AIDS are approximately 36 times as
likely to commit suicide than men in the general population." Id. at 1333, 1336.
199. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 467. The dissent points to discrimination in employ-
ment, education, housing, and medical treatment which make AIDS just as difficult to deal
with on a social level as on a psychological level. Id.. Other courts have suggested that,
"the special characteristics of AIDS and AIDS testing, the potential stigmatization of per-
sons identified as suffering from AIDS . . . and other detriments of non-consensual
mandatory testing... suggest that a much stricter standard.., should be employed where
AIDS testing is at issue." Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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interests of the general public. 2" The federal courts have recognized,
and the majority relies upon, a diminished expectation of privacy for con-
victed criminals which, under most circumstances, minimizes a criminal's
interest in not being searched.2"' The majority applies this rationale to
the juvenile sex offenders in this case. The court reasoned that because
the constitutional rights of incarcerated individuals are substantially lim-
ited, a sex offender should not be surprised to learn that her or his privacy
expectations in his or her bodily fluids are substantially diminished, as
well, because s/he "engaged in a class of criminal behavior which presents
the potential of exposing others to the AIDS virus. ''202 The court's ra-
tionale is faulty on both legal and factual bases.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that prisoners may be sub-
ject to the limitation of, and in some cases, complete withdrawal of cer-
tain rights justified by "considerations underlying [the] penal system, 2 °3
prisoners continue to retain all constitutional rights "not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives
of incarceration., 20  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the confines of a prisoner's cell because of
the state's interest in controlling the proliferation of contraband.205
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has'yet to address whether prisoners
retain their full Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their person.
In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court should apply the higher stan-
dard of scrutiny that it has applied to the pre-Skinner cases dealing with
bodily intrusions by the government. 2° The railroad industry's need for
testing in Skinner can be distinguished from the government's asserted
200. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d at 460.
201. Id. (citing Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) and Walker v. Sum-
ner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990)).
202. Id.
203. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266,
285 (1948)).
204. Id. at 523. A few examples of the rights retained by those who are incarcerated
are: the right to be free from invidious racial discrimination, id. (citing Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)); the right to exercise religious freedom, id. (citing Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam)); and the First Amendment rights of speech, id.
(citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
205. See generally Hudson, 468 U.S. 517 (holding inmates have a reasonable privacy
interest in prison cells entitling Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches).
206. See generally Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding an order directing as-
sailant to undergo surgery to remove a bullet in his shoulder for evidentiary purposes con-
stitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
1994]
312 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:281
need for HIV testing in In re Juveniles. In Skinner, the bodily intrusion
was justified by substantial data showing a correlation between substance
abuse and train accidents.20 7 A demonstrated connection between sex
offenses and HIV transmission has not been documented by the medical
community.2 °8 In In re Juveniles, the Supreme Court of Washington
failed to acknowledge the higher standard traditionally accorded to such
bodily intrusions in making its decision.
Additionally, the facts of In re Juveniles do not support the majority's
conclusion that testing of all the juveniles was warranted. The courts
have declined to allow the testing of employees whose interaction with
clients presented only a negligible risk of transmitting HIV.2 9 Only two
juveniles, Juvenile "A" and Juvenile "D," engaged in behavior that
presented a substantial risk of transmitting HIV.210 The special needs
'doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court should not be construed
as completely eliminating the requirement that some degree of rationale
exist for a search to be valid.21 ' Testing the other juveniles offends both
the notions of reasonableness and justice.
B. Constitutional Right to Privacy
1. Informational Privacy-Confidentiality
A state's use of its police power to protect the public health carries
with it a presumption of constitutionality.212 However, use of the police
power will only be deemed valid if it is rationally related to the protection
of public health and safety.213 Additionally, the Supreme Court has re-
207. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1989). See also
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Custom Service's drug screening program was a "kind of immola-
tion of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use").
208. Gostin, supra note 38, at 1436.
209. See generally Glover v. Eastern Neb. Comm'ty Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461
(8th Cir.) (holding requirement that certain employees submit to mandatory HIV testing
unreasonable because risk of transmission of HIV from patient to health care personnel in
this setting was negligible), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
210. See supra notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
211. Even in Skinner, the government presented substantial evidence that drug and al-
cohol abuse was a problem among employees in the transportation industry. See supra
note 109 and accompanying text. It is also important to note that one of the strongest
criticisms of Von Raab arose from the lack of evidence presented by the government that
drug and alcohol abuse were a problem warranting testing. See National Tyeasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81 (1989) (Scalia J., dissenting).
212. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904) (requiring smallpox vaccinations
was a reasonable means of protecting public health).
213. Weissman & Childers, supra note 30, at 465 (citing Jacobsen, 197 U.S. at 31).
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quired that the government action allowing collection or dissemination of
information be reasonably related to the government's purpose for col-
lecting the information.2 14 Application of this principle to the mandatory
testing scheme developed by the State of Washington reveals that the
scheme fails to hold up against the rational relation standard. The major-
ity in In re Juveniles examined the limited disclosure provision of the stat-
ute and concluded that because the offender suffered only a minimal
intrusion upon his privacy interests, the confidentiality branch of privacy
had been satisfied.215 However, the majority omitted the rational rela-
tionship test from its analysis. Washington's legislature enacted the
mandatory testing scheme to curb the spread of AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases.216 The legislature sought to accomplish this by giv-
ing victims of sex offenses information about the HIV status of the perpe-
trators.217 However, mandatory testing of the offender is not a rational
way to help the victim prevent the spread of the disease because of irreg-
ularities in the testing procedures which may cause erroneous results.218
The inaccuracy of current testing coupled with the devastating social im-
pact of disclosure, including all types of discrimination, combine to make
a strong case for tight regulation of HIV test results.219
2. Right to Privacy in Autonomous Decision-Making
The U.S. Supreme Court found a fundamental right of privacy to exist
in circumstances where "abolition of a privilege or immunity, essential to
a scheme of ordered liberty would violate a principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamen-
tal."'220 Both the majority and the dissent in In re Juveniles acknowledge
that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard applied to legislative
schemes that affect fundamental rights. The Court considers three factors
214. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
215. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 461 (Wash. 1993). See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.24.340(1)(a) (West 1992).
216. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340(1)(a) (West 1992).
217. Id.
218. See supra part II.B.
219. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTIUTIONAL'LAW § 15-16, at 1394-96 (2d ed. 1988).
The author notes that dissemination of HIV information must be handled with extreme
care because, "[d]issemination of the fact that someone has contracted AIDS, or even
tested positive for antibodies to the virus... can cause that person to lose his employment,
housing, insurance coverage, visitation rights with his children, and other privileges, rights
and opportunities." Id. at 1394.
220. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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when evaluating statutes under the strict scrutiny standard: first, whether
the government has a compelling need justifying the invasion; second,
whether the means of achieving the government's compelling interests
are narrowly tailored; and third, whether the government employed the
least intrusive means of achieving that goal.22'
Mandatory testing of a convicted sex offender is not the least intrusive
manner in which to stop the spread of HIV because of the potentially
devastating social and psychological impact HIV testing can have on the
tested individual.222 Mandatory testing is also not the best method for
controlling the spread of HIV because, if the test shows a negative result
when the perpetrator is HIV-positive, the victim, unaware of the infec-
tion, may unknowingly infect others.
VI. CONCLUSION: A STRICTER STANDARD IS NEEDED
AIDS is a frightening disease. Society cannot condemn legislators for
reacting to the AIDS crisis with zeal, but the legislators have a duty to act
reasonably, not irrationally. Mandatory HIV testing schemes, such as the
one enacted in Washington under the "special needs" doctrine, exacer-
bate the already existing paranoia surrounding AIDS and unnecessarily
complicate the matter by perpetuating ignorance and misunderstanding.
When courts are given permission to analyze the right of a human being
to be free from intrusive testing by the same standard they apply to
searches of buildings and junkyards, society will inevitably suffer.223
Mandatory testing disserves the victims of sexual assault, by potentially
providing them with misinformation about their HIV status, and dis-
serves offenders, by callously disregarding their constitutional rights
through the severe and unwarranted intrusion that HIV testing imposes
into their lives.
The nature and impact of the AIDS virus require substantial considera-
tion of personal privacy and dignity, and therefore require adherence to
the probable cause standard before the government can conduct non-con-
sensual HIV testing. Accordingly, mandatory testing statutes would be
best analyzed within the framework of the probable cause doctrine enun-
ciated by the Court in Winston v. Lee.224 The Supreme Court's approach
221. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 469 (Wash. 1993).
222. See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
223. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
224. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The Court held that some bodily intrusions are so great that
they may be unreasonable even if probable cause is present. Id. at 759.
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in Winston is the most appropriate standard by which to analyze HIV
testing statutes because the Court placed the proper amount of emphasis
on the right of an individual to be free from unreasonable intrusions by
the state. The intrusiveness of mandatory HIV testing necessitates the
preservation of the probable cause requirement. At the very least, the
government should be required to show that the circumstances of the sex-
ual assault were such that HIV could have been transmitted from of-
fender to victim and thus, establish that probable cause exists to conduct
the search.22
The AIDS epidemic must be dealt with in a rational manner through
rational policies that truly protect public health. The courts have an obli-
gation to resist popular pressure and preserve the fundamental constitu-
tional principles of privacy and freedom from unreasonable government
intrusion. Our legislatures and our courts must not sacrifice privacy and
human dignity in a superficial gesture seemingly designed to deal with the
AIDS crisis faced by our nation.
Christine M. Stevenson
225. In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d 455, 465 (Wash. 1993).
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